Network Pentesting: Tools, Workflow, and Reporting

Network pentesting splits into two engagements that are very different in scope and tooling: external (what an attacker on the public internet sees) and internal (what an attacker who got in via phishing or a USB drop can do). Both deserve a real methodology.
External network engagement
You start with the IP ranges and domain assets in scope. Discovery via masscan or nmap finds open ports across the entire range. Service enumeration tells you what is listening. From there: known-CVE checks against version banners, default credentials on management interfaces, exposed admin panels, and configuration weaknesses (open SMTP relay, exposed databases, S3 misconfig).
Internal network engagement
Assume the attacker has a laptop on the corporate LAN. The pattern: ARP discovery, MitM where useful, hunt for unauthenticated SMB/NFS shares, attack legacy protocols (LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning with Responder), Kerberoast, AS-REP roast, lateral move via PsExec or WMI, dump LSASS where domain admin is found. CrackMapExec is the swiss-army knife for the entire flow.
The toolkit
- nmap with NSE scripts for discovery and version detection.
- masscan for sweeping huge ranges quickly.
- Nessus or OpenVAS for vulnerability scanning — but only as a starting point.
- Responder, Impacket, BloodHound for AD attacks.
- Metasploit for exploitation when an exploit module is appropriate.
- Wireshark for analysis when something behaves oddly.
What separates a good report from a bad one
Bad reports are a Nessus dump in PDF form. Good reports are narratives — they explain how an attacker would chain findings together, what business impact each finding has, and what the org should fix first. A finding that says "TLS 1.0 enabled" is noise; a finding that says "TLS 1.0 enabled on the customer portal where an attacker can downgrade and steal sessions" is signal.
The findings that always show up
- Outdated software with known CVEs (especially perimeter VPNs and firewalls).
- Weak or default credentials on management interfaces.
- SMBv1 enabled on internal hosts.
- Kerberoastable service accounts with weak passwords.
- Domain users with passwords in description fields.
- Backup shares world-readable.
How often to do this
Annually at minimum, plus after any major architecture change. PCI-DSS and ISO 27001 expect annual external pentests; cyber insurance increasingly demands them. If you are an Indian SMB, our cybersecurity team runs scoped network pentests with reports auditors accept.

Further reading
Frequently asked questions
How does an external network pentest start?
You start with the IP ranges and domain assets in scope. Discovery via masscan or nmap finds open ports across the entire range. Service enumeration tells you what is listening.
What separates a good pentest report from a bad one?
Bad reports are a Nessus dump in PDF form. Good reports are narratives - they explain how an attacker would chain findings together, what business impact each finding has, and what the org should fix first.
How often should a network pentest be done?
Annually at minimum, plus after any major architecture change. PCI-DSS and ISO 27001 expect annual external pentests; cyber insurance increasingly demands them.
